While everything from potatoes to postage stamps became dearer, Nehru, it was said, was a broken man who had to sack the then defence minister V. Krishna Menon. This book endeavours to accomplish two goals. First, it brings out the changing nature of civil-military relations in India since the country’s independence.In analysing civilian control, while the author correctly maintains that it is the cornerstone of a democracy and in most democracies, the military works as an agent of the government remaining under civilian supremacy. In authoritarian regimes, the military performs a dual role of fighting wars and making policy., The Evolution of India’s Higher Defence Organization, Nuclear Weapons Development in a Strategic Vacuum, The Effects of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons on Civil-Military Relations in India and The Indian Military’s Role in Unconventional Operations. However, democracies pride themselves in a clear demarcation of roles between civilian and military functions.These two instances are classic examples of negative/disastrous versus positive/pro-active approaches to national security.

The perception of Major T. Francis, one of the official interpreters during Zhou En Lai’s visit to India in 1962, did not match with the interpretation that the others gave. And post-1971, a process of downgrading the military’s status is amply reflected in orders of precedence and the Central Pay Commissions (CPCs), particularly the 6th CPC for its anomaly in the grant of Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU) to defence forces. And the other is of misusing it by often not using it or not optimally using it, when it should have been used in sheer national interest against external aggression.In the 1950s, when Indian Army’s top brass apprised the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru about the Chinese build-up and incursions, concerted with release of maps, he trashed their reports, naively complacent with his belief in the Panchsheel agreement and the Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai mantra. Giving her approval without any delay, that too when she was in a cabinet meeting, Indian Army’s retaliation resulted in about 400 of its Chinese troops being killed. Along with the above shortcomings, daft and rigid political directions of “forward posture”, “not to lose an inch of ground” and not using the Air Force in offensive manner so as “ to not raise the level of confrontation” made the defeat hurt the Armed Forces all the more.

Again, thanks to Gandhi’s decisive and assertive nature, the planning, preparation and implementation in the third war waged by Pakistan against India in December 1971 was fought in a Chanakyan or Kautilyan mode.M. While Gandhi’s approach, dealings and decisions related to 1967 and 1971 were indeed effective and did have some influence on her son, Rajiv Gandhi who later succeeded her (responding to Chinese army at Sumdorong Chu, Arunachal Pradesh in 1986). Further, a convoy of vehicles was destroyed and many Chinese bunkers were levelled. While subsequent governments failed to follow the assertive approach, what we are seeing in 2013, in dealing with both China and Pakistan are the nadir. Bakshi, requested for the permission to respond with artillery fire. In a democracy, for effective governance, civilian control of the military is considered a critical necessity. Second, in discussing the changes, the book addresses some vital factors.The book is a must read for all categories of professionals dealing with national security, particularly decision makers in the government. In 1967, when Chinese Army upped the ante at Nathu La, Sikkim, by mortar bombardment in addition to killing a number of Indian Army officers and soldiers, the then Brigade Commander, Brig M. Indian Army, inadequately armed with over half-a-century-old bolt action . Gandhi’s decision to take the recommendation of the Army Chief Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw seriously, resulted in 93,000 Pakistan armed forces surrendering to Indian Army at Dhaka within two weeks of the war in erstwhile East Pakistan.

The fact that the author is the daughter of an army officer may well have been motivating for her to take on the complex issue of civil-military relations in India. The message that 1962 cannot be repeated went across to the Chinese very effectively, resulting in not a single bullet being fired by them till date. In most democracies, the executive, whether the President or the Prime Minister, is responsible for formulating policy while the military is designed to be a war fighting force entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the country’s territorial sovereignty from external and wholesale nylon easy drive anchors internal attacks. Of particular importance are her book’s four chapters, viz. This could only be sanctioned by the defence minister, whose portfolio was then held by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. These issues have significant implications for understanding the conduct of war and the strategic choices facing India’s leadership.P. The Nehru-Krishna Menon duo’s response to China was a combination of absolute absence of strategic perception along with a contemptuous manner of dealing with an obedient and apolitical military leadership.

India since Independence stands out as a country which being the world’s most populous democracy is one in which the military, despite being apolitical and a bulwark of nation building, has been not only given a raw deal by the politico-bureaucratic establishment but also been majorly misused on two counts. He predicted that China would attack India in six months.303 Lee Enfield rifles, insufficient ammunition and lack of warm clothes, suffered a humiliating defeat with around 1,860 casualties. One is of misusing it to deal with certain internal situations, which the police has failed to deal with effectively. Moreover, the issues addressed contain critical implications for the nature of Indian democracy since the performance and legitimacy of the military as an instrument of the state is a major factor in determining the viability of the state.S.